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Abstract
This study investigates challenges posed by 
Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICTs) in the enactment of Information Systems (IS) 
project control. Using the control perspective 
developed by the sociologist John Law, we conducted 
an interpretive study of an Enterprise Resource 
Planning System implementation at a large public 
university system. From our investigation, four 
salient insights emerge. These insights are 
accompanied by corresponding assertions that 
demonstrate how ICTs, through varied forms of 
involvement, may challenge IS project control 
enactment. We integrate these insights for deeper 
illumination and conclude with contributions and 
implications of this study. 
1. Introduction and Motivation: ICTs 
and Enactment of IS Project Control 
The issue of control in IS projects is an important 
one, because it is one of the key factors involved in 
the ultimate success of projects [11]. Control has 
been defined “as the set of mechanisms used to 
motivate individuals to act in a way that is consistent 
with organizational objectives” [14, p. 489]. 
Generally, research on IS project control understands 
ICTs as playing the role of “communication and 
control systems that are standard, compatible, and 
reliable [emphasis added]” [2, p. 64] that aid in the 
implementation of control by controllers. 
In IS literature, technologies and their associated 
techniques and procedures thus provide for the set of 
mechanisms to ensure normativity with 
organizational objectives. Control research has seen 
substantial work within the IS discipline; however, a 
few blind spots in this literature can be discerned. For 
example, in a fairly recent review of control literature 
in IS, it has been observed that “existing research 
primarily studies the contextual antecedents and 
performance consequences of control modes and 
amounts, and thus focuses on control portfolio 
configurations”  [28, p. 741]. As a response to this 
limitation, current research is engaging more with the 
notion of control enactment (beyond just control 
modes and their antecedents/outcomes). Control 
enactment captures how control issues are played out 
in an organizational setting, such as through 
dynamics between controllers and controlees  [12]. 
Our study adds to this emerging stream of research 
on control enactment [e.g., 20], but with a rather 
unique perspective. We propose that apart from 
humans being controllers or controlees, ICTs could 
also be viewed in a similar fashion. Therefore, we 
extend the control enactment literature by showing 
how ICTs can serve as controllers and controlees or 
can interfere in how control enactment takes place 
between controllers and controlees. For example, we 
show how ICTs, when subjected to being controlees, 
can also “rebound” and try to become controllers – 
thus shaping the dynamics of control enactment. 
Treating ICTs as unexpected shapers of 
organizational dynamics has been studied in prior 
research [25] and our study follows the same 
approach by assigning agency to nonhumans like 
ICTs. For this purpose, we use the control 
perspective proposed by the British sociologist John 
Law [16, 17], and investigate the following research 
question: How can ICTs shape enactment of IS 
project control, especially in unexpected ways? 
Specifically, we investigate how roles of ICTs in the 
enactment of control emerge and change over time, 
especially in an unexpected (and often undesired) 
manner. This change could be the result of actions by 
actors to be controlled [21], unintended technological 
failure [13], or complex interactions between human 
choices and/or operations of technology [7]. For 





example, ICTs which are regarded as tools for 
enforcing organizational form and control, may 
produce unintended disruptive effects and radically 
change pre-determined outcomes (i.e., control 
objectives) by enforcing novel/disruptive innovations 
[19]. Such unintended effects of ICTs often 
compromise control enactment in IS projects. Our 
study thus extends insights beyond the view that 
ICTs help in systematically enabling project control 
[22]. We show that ICTs can be “disobedient” and 
can try to warp control enactment in IS projects. 
2. The Theoretical Lens of this Study:
Law’s Control Perspective
For key definitions and concepts in Law’s control 
perspective [16, 17], please refer to Table 1 (all tables 
are included at the end). Law explains control as 
being exercised by, through, and over interactions 
amongst actors forming parts of actor-networks. An 
actor-network for exercising control contains the 
controlling actors or focal actors, the actors over 
whom control must be exercised, and the actors that 
exercise control on behalf of the controlling actor 
(called envoys). Envoys create inscriptions and 
envelopes to help them pursue the interest of the 
focal actors. The focal actors must exercise control 
over the other actors in the network to induce the 
latter to play roles in which they take actions to 
accomplish the objectives set for the actor-network. 
An important process in this regard is 
punctualization.  
When–through the process of punctualization–groups 
of actors become highly aligned in terms of their 
interests and actions, they can be treated by the 
controlling actor as a single actor that serves as a 
resource in a larger network.  However, 
punctualization requires successful translation of the 
actors in the actor-network by the focal actor. 
Notably, in Law’s perspective of control, 
punctualization is a process marked by struggles [17], 
because actors may be resistant (or may later become 
resistant) to the objectives for which control is being 
exercised. Often translation requires the passage of 
an actor through the obligatory passage point, beyond 
which the actor subscribes to the interests of the focal 
actors.  However, in some cases, the actors in the 
actor-network may reverse this passage; in such 
cases, the network may become de-punctualized. 
Law's control perspective differs from that found in 
most IS project control studies in multiple ways. 
Control for Law is a process with potentially 
uncertain objectives and outcomes and disavows 
technological and social determinism. Notably, 
Law’s perspective does not distinguish between 
human and non-human actors. Thus, ICTs, as non-
human actors can play as important a role in 
exercising (or compromising) control enactment. 
This is a primary reason why we embrace Law’s 
perceptive, as it allows us to ascribe a pivotal role to 
ICTs. 
3. The Empirical Study
We conducted an interpretive case study [27] to 
investigate our research question using Law’s control 
perspective. This case describes the process to 
implement three generations of the enterprise 
resource planning system (named ERP-Star) at the 
Varied University System (or VUS) (pseudonyms are 
used for anonymity). The four VUS universities 
include U1 University, U2 University, U3 University, 
and U4 University or U1, U2, U3, and U4, 
respectively. 
VUS is overseen by a board of regents (BOR).  The 
BOR guides VUS and makes high-level decisions. 
The chancellor is charged with implementing the 
BOR’s decisions, while being U1’s president.  The 
chancellor and his/her high-ranking subordinates 
comprise the university system administration or UA. 
Each university has its own administration, led by a 
president who enjoys a high level of discretion in 
governing their universities and members of the 
faculty and staff (FS) who work there. However, each 
president is subordinate to the BOR and subject to 
VUS policies.  
3.1. Conducting the Study: Using the Cole 
and Avison 2007 hermeneutical 
framework 
This entire research study, including the initial 
formulation of inquiry, to the analysis of case data 
through which we developed the ultimate theoretical 
assertions was based upon completing the 
hermeneutic circle, a central idea in interpretive 
research, as advised by Klein and Myers [15].  This 
principle calls for researchers to engage in a process 
following the principle that human understanding 
occurs through the iterative act of  moving between a 
whole and interdependent parts comprising that 
whole [15]. In particular, Cole and Avison [6] 
provide a framework to conduct hermeneutic 
research which our study uses (see Table 2). Data 
was mainly collected as semi-structured interviews 
(33 initial and 34 follow up) with key project 
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stakeholders. Additional sources (e.g., newspaper 
articles emails, etc.) were also collected. Analysis 
proceeded along the Cole and Avison guidelines, 
informed by Law’s control perspective. 
4. Empirical Analysis: The Case Insights
This section distills the key insights from our analysis 
of the ERP-Star case, beginning with challenges to IS 
project control from ICTs that hindered other actors’ 
understanding of the project. 
4.1. Insight 1. ICTs Hindering IS Project 
Control by Clouding Actors’ 
Understandings of Projects’ Status 
Viewed through Law’s perspective, the VUS case 
sheds new light on challenges to identifying problems 
and their root causes, in part due to the involvement 
or lack of involvement of multiple ICTs, as well as 
relations among them. In other words, ICTs used for 
such purposes failed to live up to focal actors’ 
expectations of the faithfulness of such envoys. 
This behavior of ICTs as unfaithful envoys appeared 
to occur through at least two channels.  First, the 
controlling actor enrolled a copy of organizational 
data that was insufficiently comprehensive or 
outdated into a relationship as part of the envelope of 
an envoy, ERP-Star’s testing version. However, this 
action was unsuccessful. A UA member provided an 
example:   
“We tested that [a cancellation for nonpayment 
process in ERP-Star]…but because we didn’t test it 
on the whole population, we missed some things that 
it was doing that we really didn’t want it to do.  It 
overlooked canceling some groups of students that 
we did want canceled” 
Second, the controlling actor and members of the FS 
differed in their understanding of what components 
were needed to provide accurate results to support 
testing.  The controlling actors, the UA and 
implementation team (IT), understood that a certain 
set of elements were those needed for effective 
testing (e.g., ERP-Star’s testing version and testing 
plans).  However, a U3 manager (part of FS) 
contended that he did not have access to a report 
needed for accurate results: 
“…we can’t actually see the effect it’s [entering 
data] having on the system [ERP-Star] without 
having a report.  So you kinda felt like you were 
testing with like half the tools that you needed.”   
In these instances of the enrollment of envoys to be 
used to understand project status, the result was 
unsatisfactory.  This envoy, a testing version of ERP-
Star, had the capacity to provide accurate accounts of 
project status. However, thanks to the enrollment of 
or failure to enroll other actors, it took on the role of 
‘deceiver.’ In other words, this envoy posed a 
challenge to control by hindering actors’ capacity to 
develop an accurate understanding of problems the 
projects faced and slowed the diagnosis of such 
problems’ causes.  Based upon these insights, we 
offer the first assertion: 
Assertion1. ICTs enrolled to monitor and identify 
project problems can provide deceptively 
favorable views of projects; creating these 
deceptive views can delay problem resolution, 
which can interfere with efforts to punctualize a 
system such as ERP-Star, and possibly lead to 
additional project costs. 
4.2. Insight 2. Data Stored/Processed by 
ICTs Compromising Actors’ 
Supportive Roles in IS Projects 
Data, as an actor, was influential in compromising 
control in project settings. Primarily, Data impeded 
actors’ efforts to induce other actors to comply with 
the objectives of the former actors. First, the absence 
of complete data showed to FS as part of training 
created an impediment for the successful 
implementation process by compromising actors’ 
support. For example, an U1 academic advisor noted:  
“Because in the training they said, ‘Okay, in order to 
view student data, this is where you go.  But you 
can’t view it yet.  It’s not – all the data is not 
converted yet.  You can’t do this.’” 
Had this data been available in the training version of 
ERP-Star, this member of FS suggested that FS 
would have been more supportive of the 
implementation process. An associate dean at U2 
recalled an instance of distrusting Data, which 
ultimately extended to distrusting ERP-Star itself. 
“The error rate [of data] was in the neighborhood of 
70% and that is NOT a good neighborhood.  Were 
the data put into the system incorrectly?  Did ERP-
Star simply not identify the correct data?  Both? 
Neither?  I will likely never know.  However, it was 
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such drastically poor data [emphasis added] that set 
the perception that one could not trust ERP-Star 
data…We simply could not believe anything ERP-
Star produced.  It is this complete mistrust of ERP-
Star [emphasis added] that has the greatest impact 
on our work.”  
Data also presented challenges for the actor-network 
assembled by the UA and the IT due to lacking 
particular characteristics desired by other actors.  The 
interactions that concern us are those of which data is 
a part (e.g., training FS members), entailing activities 
intended to contribute to control of the project. 
Drawing upon Law’s perspective, control can be 
understood as successful translation of actors in an 
actor network by the focal actor(s). Also, translation 
has four moments (please see Table 1)– 
problematization, interessement, enrollment, and 
mobilization. In this case, the translation of the other 
actors (e.g., FS) by the key actors (e.g., UA and IT) 
was achieved up to a certain point. In Law’s language 
of control, problematization, interessement, and 
enrollment were successful. However, mobilization 
was hampered by Data as is evidenced above. Thus, 
Data created an impediment to the control envisioned 
by the focal actors. The major ramification of this 
was that other actors’ buy-in of the implementation 
process suffered because of Data. So, while these 
actors were problematized, interessed, and enrolled 
by the focal actors to support the implementation 
process, they started to distrust Data and ERP-Star as 
a result. Hence, we propose our second assertion: 
Assertion 2: Data stored/processed by ICTs may 
become an impediment to control objectives; 
specifically, it can lead to incomplete translation 
by hampering mobilization and so create distrust 
in the ICT itself by actors in the actor-network. 
4.3. Insight 3. Project Control and ICTs: 
Negotiating with ICTs and Accepting 
Compromises 
The IT tried to use different ICTs beyond ERP-Star 
as additional envoys to interess and enroll actors into 
the project and mobilize them in support of the 
projects. While one ICT (Microsoft Project) acted as 
an obedient enabler of project control, the 
involvement of another ICT was more problematic. 
Actors (e.g., the IT) had implemented a ‘dashboard’ 
in response to a delay in the U2 Student 
Administration application upgrade.  This Microsoft 
Excel-based tool was planned to give its users a 
more-complete, high-level view of project status. 
The problem that this plan faced was that the 
dashboard had competition.  An U1 manager 
described the competing list used by programmers:  
“You can see…a number of items that are not on our 
list. This was the beginning of our effort to capture 
all those on the dashboard and to eliminate shadow 
tracking with secret information.”   
It was necessary to reconcile the two views of the 
project status to reduce the likelihood of 
misunderstanding that would hinder the effectiveness 
of efforts to punctualize ERP-Star. The 
punctualization of ERP-Star, as we shall see in later, 
was a primary control objective for the projects.  In 
Law’s terms, this negotiation process, as part of 
translating actors, made it possible for the dashboard 
to play its intended role after a time. 
The negotiation with ICTs did not stop here. While 
ICTs could be turned into obedient members (i.e., 
obedient controlees) of the projects’ actor-network, 
they could also be stubborn.  It was also the case that 
controlling actors’ negotiation with an ICT could 
result in the latter dictating conditions of its 
involvement in the project.  In other words, this 
negotiation for the ICT’s involvement carried costs 
for controlling actors.  An example of this costly 
negotiation is the involvement of the technology 
known as QUANT in the process.  
QUANT was a packaged software technology 
intended to move modifications to ERP-Star into the 
production environment and to track the status of 
work on such modifications.  Originally, QUANT 
was intended by actors leading technical aspects of 
the projects effort to transfer large numbers of 
changed elements or patches into the ERP-Star 
production environment.  The IT had already learned 
(from another client) that this might not be possible:  
“The subject of large volumes of objects came up 
specifically with trying to use QUANT to migrate the 
ERP-Star vendor’s updates and fixes patches into 
application environments.  They the other client 
explained to us that they had attempted this several 
times and found that the product bogged down and 
would not handle the volume...” 
Again, QUANT refused to function under the 
condition of high volumes identified by the other 
client.  For VUS personnel to receive other benefits 
that QUANT could offer (e.g., allowing monitoring 
of modifications made to ERP-Star), a compromise 
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was required.  We see that QUANT was a 
disobedient piece of software that could not be used 
in all the originally desired ways. Specifically, ICTs 
such as QUANT demanded negotiations from the 
focal actors for an altered and reduced role (i.e., the 
controlee turned into a controller). In other words, 
they contributed to the punctualization of ERP-Star 
only when their “demands” were met. Crucially, 
these ICTs demanded a price for their “obedience” in 
supporting the projects’ objectives – one of which 
was to punctualize ERP-Star into a resource as we 
see later in the meta-theme.  
Considered in light of Law’s work and the related 
literature, the concept of disobedient, non-human 
actors is not a foreign one [17, 18].  The steps of 
translation to gain the compliance of an actor may 
entail force, persuasion, and negotiation.  This 
negotiation may be problematic, including incurring 
additional costs. This concept of problematic 
negotiation with ICTs provides the basis for the 
following assertion: 
Assertion 3: ICTs, intended for use in controlling 
a project, may be potentially used as envoys for 
punctualizing key actors; however, such ICTs may 
negotiate their “price” for their obedience; 
specifically, this may result in additional costs for 
the project either in the procurement of new 
resources or the imposition of dilatory procedures. 
4.4. Insight 4. ERP-Star’s Adversarial 
Relationships with other ICTs and ICT 
components 
Through much of the case timeline, ERP-Star was 
engaged in adversarial relationships with other ICTs 
or ICT components.  The common effect of these 
clashes appeared to be compromising ERP-Star’s 
status as a punctualized actor that could serve as a 
resource for the controlling actors and others. We 
consider here three examples: ERP-Star’s 
relationship with Emblem, the relationship between 
ERP-Star and e-Manage, and the relationship of 
ERP-Star with data to be entered into it.  
The U3 administration group saw Emblem as 
superior to ERP-Star, as one manager explained: 
“…from a satisfaction point of view, from a business 
needs point of view, our product [Emblem] is still 
superior to what ERP-Star can do…we can’t see 
anything that would add value…for us to be 
transferring to ERP-Star.” 
Characteristics such as these contributed to U3’s 
success in gaining the BOR’s permission to use 
Emblem in place of ERP-Star.  Emblem effectively 
challenged ERP-Star’s place in the project’s actor-
network.  Rather than being the one solution being 
implemented to solve the problems at VUS, ERP-Star 
entered into a relationship with Emblem in which 
both could serve as such effective solutions. 
In the instance of E-Manage, ERP-Star again 
compared unfavorably to it. One student interviewed 
by the U1 newspaper offered this criticism of ERP-
Star:  
“It has caused me nothing but problems," a student 
said "It has been a huge inconvenience for me in 
preparing for this upcoming semester, and it has held 
me back from getting things done, which would have 
been much easier to do using the old system [E-
Manage]."”  
Lastly, ERP-Star’s production versions contributed to 
conflict with ICT components.  For example, at U2, a 
member of the FS working to recruit students 
recalled ERP-Star’s refusal to accept data in Excel 
format:  
“You have them [data on prospective students] in 
[an] Excel spreadsheet…40,000 names or 100,000 
names…to send them direct mail…and then you don’t 
have it in the prospect database [an ERP-Star 
component], because there’s no way to upload the 
thing, you know, fairly easily, without having to 
manually enter all those names…” 
To overcome this obstacle U2 FS had to undertake a 
workaround of manually entering the data.  In 
addition, a U2 faculty member recalled another 
barrier imposed by ERP-Star: 
“The big problem with ERP-Star…is [that it is] so 
rigid that it makes liars out of us all. We  kind of 
had to figure out how to schedule our classes.”  
Members of U2’s FS had to provide ERP-Star with 
fabricated enrollment information or else ERP-Star 
did not reserve classrooms (i.e., ERP-Star was 
“controlling” their actions). It is interesting to note 
that this step assisted members of FS to draw upon 
ERP-Star as a taken-for-granted resource though not 
as intended by the UA and IT, while simultaneously 
interfering with ERP-Star’s ability to provide 
accurate reporting (a goal of the controlling actors).  
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Lastly, members of FS at U4 also experienced ERP-
Star’s ‘refusal’ to accept another format of data entry: 
which letter grades faculty could enter for students.  
A U4 manager explained the challenge that ERP-Star 
posed:  
“…it’s a mod [modification to ERP-Star’s code] that 
was written for U2…U2 had a mod that would 
prevent the issuance of a W.  Well, we want to have a 
W…for grades for faculty…but, because of that mod, 
it was preventing us from being able to do that.” 
These barriers to forming relationships with ICT 
components (e.g., forms of data to be entered) 
stemmed from inscriptions that ERP-Star carried, 
having been inscribed by its vendor or through the 
modification that project actors made to earlier 
production versions to meet a need of U2’s FS. 
While these inscriptions could be overcome with 
manual workarounds, entering fabricated 
information, and additional coding, they initially 
contributed to difficulties in maintaining ERP-Star’s 
status as a punctualized actor.  Based upon these 
three variants of ERP-Star’s conflict with other 
technologies, we offer our fourth assertion: 
Assertion 4:  An ICT, intended by controlling 
actors to serve as a punctualized resource, may be 
compromised by its adversarial relationships with 
other ICTs and ICT components; the development 
of these adversarial relationships may result from 
the ICTs excluded from an actor-network, or 
inscriptions written into the ICT to be 
punctualized. 
5. Integration: The Challenge of
Punctualization for Enacting IS
Project Control
These four insights into challenges that ICTs can 
pose to IS project control enactment indicate the 
existence of an underlying meta-theme that can 
holistically capture how ICTs compromise control 
enactment. This common theme points to the role and 
ramifications of punctualization in actor-networks. 
As discussed in Table 1, punctualization entails the 
changing of an actor-network that makes up a part of 
a more extensive actor-network [18]. Through this 
changing, this actor-network becomes, in effect, a 
single actor. Thus, punctualization is a key technique 
for focal actors to exercise control, by reducing 
heterogeneity, and the punctualized actor often serves 
as a consolidated resource for control [26]. 
In our context, controlling the ERP-Star 
implementation and upgrade process was an 
important endeavor in the eyes of the key controlling 
actors. From a punctualization standpoint, this 
involved turning ERP-Star into a taken-for-granted 
resource, maintaining ERP-Star in this condition, and 
attempting to use this resource for furthering the 
control objectives established for the process. 
Throughout much of the process, achieving effective, 
sustained punctualization was a key focus of the 
work of the controlling actors. In effect, the 
controlling actors desired that ERP-Star would 
operate as an “obedient” controlee by being fully 
punctualized. 
However, ERP-Star was punctualized to an extent; at 
the same time, other elements of ERP-Star were not, 
presenting challenges to the controllers’ objectives. 
Thus, it would be more accurate to say that ERP-Star 
exhibited the quality of being simultaneously 
punctualized and un-punctualized. In other words, it 
faithfully played the role of a controlee at times, 
while at other times, it assumed a more controlling 
role. 
Instances of the ICT (here components of ERP-Star’s 
production versions) appeared to reach 
punctualization and the desired, taken-for-granted 
status while co-existing with others that did not attain 
a punctualized state.  In response, controlling actors 
appeared to seek to make corrections to strengthen 
ERP-Star as a resource.  This entailed bringing in 
new actors, such as additional technology or other 
artifacts (e.g., a help guide) as envoys of the 
controlling actors.  Doing so was sometimes 
problematic. For example, this help guide did not 
perform as expected and required modifications to 
enhance its effectiveness.  Examined from Law’s 
perspective, the actors, not limited to the controlling 
actors, seeking to use ERP-Star, attempted to enroll 
additional sometimes problematic actors into the 
actor-network or to alter the enrollment of other 
actors (e.g., the testing version of ERP-Star).  In 
some cases, these attempts led to the desired effects, 
while in others they did not.  
Punctualization creates a black box that is assumed to 
be functional [3], i.e., fully compliant with control 
objectives. It is because of this that punctualization 
has always been a key issue in project management 
especially related to IS implementations [4, 25]. As 
punctualization is often synonymous with the 
reduction of a network’s heterogeneity, it makes it 
simpler and easier for the focal actors to enforce 
control [25]. Therefore, the controller prefers 
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punctualization because of its inherent simplicity in 
enforcing control [4]. However, punctualization is 
subject to threats.  Therefore, punctualization 
attempts may not always be successful. In other 
words, punctualization may result in increased 
control for the controlling actors, which is why they 
prefer it, but the very attempt at punctualization may 
create negative outcomes and compromise control 
enactment simultaneously. Thus, punctualization has 
a complex and interesting relationship with control, 
as evidenced by this study. In line with our 
discussion, we formally explicate our meta-theme as 
the following set of assertions: 
a. Efforts of focal actors in establishing
control by punctualizing an ICT may not
be wholly successful due to
constraints/resistances established by
other actors, including versions of the
ICT itself; consequently, it can be difficult
for an ICT to obtain the status of a
punctualized resource to enable control.
b. Strategies to enforce punctualization
might be successful, but they can often
result in the misappropriation of the ICT
and hinder accomplishing project
objectives.
c. As a result, an ICT can exist
simultaneously in a punctualized and un-
punctualized state that both enables and
challenges control of the project by the
focal actors.
6. Contributions and Implications
6.1. Contributions to research
We contribute to the IS project control literature by 
offering a richer view of the possible role of an ICT 
(an ERP, in this case) in the enactment of control.  
Prior literature has argued that ICTs help enable 
controls [2, 22] due to the fact that they can act as 
consolidated resources and can tighten controls [26]. 
However, in this study we see that ERP-Star never 
reached the consolidated status of “punctualization”. 
It existed both in a punctualized and an un-
punctualized state. In other words, the ICT was in a 
state of flux, quite distant from the reliable and 
systematic conceptualization of ICTs found in the 
extant project control literature [2, 22]. As a result, 
the ICT compromised the enactment of control 
objectives and did not subscribe to the dominant view 
that ICTs are mechanisms to enforce control [23]. In 
reality, our study shows that ICTs are emergent [9] 
and often switch to being a controller when humans 
try to enforce/use it as a controlee. 
In addition, the insights and corresponding assertions 
themselves make important contributions to the 
literature on project control enactment. Assertion 1 
contributes to the IS project control literature by 
providing a richer view of ICTs’ relationship with a 
key element of enacting control: monitoring project 
status.  Assertion 2, related to the challenges posed by 
data stored/processed/generated by ICTs, may benefit 
multiple literatures, such as the information 
management literature [1]. This is because these 
assertions discuss the role of data which, in turn, 
gives rise to information when this “data is classified, 
summarized, transferred or corrected in order to add 
value” [8, p. 6]. Assertion 3 suggests that one role 
that ICTs may play in the project control is that of a 
disobedient actor with whom other actors must 
negotiate.  In this case, the ICT assumes the role of 
the controller. Also, we find that a consequence of 
this disobedience may be additional costs to the 
original controller stemming from negotiating with 
the disobedient ICT. Finally, Assertion 4 calls for 
researchers to take an expanded view of ICTs 
involved in project control, a view that includes 
versions of the ICT being implemented.  This 
assertion reminds researchers to not take for granted 
the influence of different versions of the ICT being 
implemented on the operation of project control. 
These versions of the ICT being implemented, in 
these adversarial relationships with other ICTs or 
their components, may compromise project control 
enactment in multiple ways such as by reducing 
employees’ support for the implementations. Overall, 
these insights also contribute to the research stream 
on control enactment [5, 29]), which seeks to explain 
how project control operates. This study furthers the 
extant research on control enactment by showing how 
ICTs can interfere with the operation of enactment 
efforts. 
6.2. Contributions to practice 
This paper makes two contributions to practice. First, 
organizational resources (e.g., pre-existing 
organizational data) may themselves have disruptive 
influences when ICTs “refuse” to perform their 
assigned tasks. Thus, this study unearths challenges 
that practitioners may face in projects and 
accordingly alerts them to take appropriate actions. 
Second, this study suggests the possibility that using 
an actor as a proxy, standing in for another actor, 
may not have expected results.  Practitioners may 
want to choose proxies wisely so that the desired 
objectives are not compromised. 
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7. Future Research Directions
First, it could be valuable to conduct a follow-up 
study in another setting that has implemented or is in 
the process of implementing a complex information 
system like ERP-Star.  This follow-up study could 
test the assertions presented in this paper. A variant 
of this follow-up study alternative could be one 
conducted in a multinational corporation.  Projects 
conducted by these corporations have been an 
increasingly common means for these organizations 
to develop and/or implement information systems 
[10].  For that reason, this follow-up study could 
provide a potentially useful complement to the 
existing studies of control enactment.  Such studies 
could also enable researchers to contribute to 
understanding ICTs’ interfering roles in control 
enactment.  
To conclude, this work has highlighted how various 
ICTs challenge and shape IS project control 
enactment. We hope that this work will energize 
future research to further investigate the nuances of 
the roles played by ICTs in the enactment of control 
in new (as well as existing) IS projects. 
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Table 1. Concepts in Law’s Perspective on Control as applied in IS literature, such as in Sarker et al. (2006)
Concept Descriptions of the concept 
Actor An entity that takes actions influencing the operation of control. 
Actor-Network A collection of actors assembled into relationships to act in concert to accomplish the objectives of 
control. 
Control A process used by a controlling actor to accomplish objectives by employing the efforts of other actors 
assembled into an actor-network. 
Envoy An actor who exercises control on behalf of the controlling actor. 
Envelope A structure composed of an envoy's relationships with other actors, as well as the envoy himself. The 
envelope influences the envoy’s capacity to exercise control. 
Inscription A piece of knowledge that has been converted into an easily reproducible and transportable form. 
Inscriptions may influence the actions that an envoy takes. 
Punctualization “Treating a heterogeneous network as an individual actor to reduce network complexity” (Sarker et al., 
2006, p. 56) 
Translation “The process of alignment of the interests of a diverse set of actors with the interests of the focal actor” 
(Sarker et al., 2006, p. 56). 
Problematization “The first moment of translation, during which a focal actor defines identities and interests of other 
actors that are consistent with its own interests, and establishes itself as an obligatory passage point 
(OPP), thus rendering itself indispensable” (p. 56) 
Interessement “The second moment of translation, which involves negotiating with actors to accept definition of the 
focal actor” (Sarker et al., 2006, p. 56) 
Enrollment “The third moment of translation, wherein other actors in the network accept (or get aligned to) interests 
defined for them by the focal actor” (Sarker et al., 2006, p. 56) 
Mobilization The fourth moment of translation, in which the focal actor attempts to ensure that speakers properly 
represent the interests for which they are to speak and do not betray them.  These speakers are to 
represent the one or more objectives that the focal actor wants to foster.  
Table 2. Using the hermeneutic framework developed by Cole and Avison (2007) to guide our study 
Stage Key sub-stages Key Activities/Considerations in each 
sub-stage 
Application to this 
research study 
Understanding The explication of prejudices Unearth the dominant motivations of the 
researchers to determine literature to be 
reviewed 
The researchers’ dominant 
motivation was to 
investigate the challenging 
roles of ICTs in enacting 
IS project control. 
Formulating lines of inquiry Determine the ‘parts’ that are key to the 
‘whole’ which will later guide the data 
collection 
The “parts” here are Law’s 
individual concepts of 
control discussed in Table 
1, linked to the “whole” 
which is his overall 
perspective of control. As 
shown below, our data 
collection and analysis use 
those “parts.” 
Explanation Conducting the active  “identify “normal” and “abnormal” Interviews focused on 
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Stage Key sub-stages Key Activities/Considerations in each 
sub-stage 
Application to this 
research study 
interview behaviors” (p. 825) and statements used “as 
reality creating activities through which 
behaviors, circumstances and persons are 
cast in instances of cultural and technical 
significance” (p. 825) 
understanding whether the 
various ICTs behaved as 
they were expected 
(consistent with the 
dominant perspective of 
control enactment) or did 
not. Interviews were also 
focused on bringing out 
the actual (real) reactions 
of key implementation 
stakeholders. 
Analyzing a priori codes Categorization, identification of tools to 
analyze data, and further interviews 
Data was categorized 
based on the concepts 
presented in Law’s control 
perspective. (e.g., actors). 
The same participants 
were interviewed multiple 
times, when possible, to 
facilitate understanding 
how their interpretations 
changed over time. 
Interpretation Breakdown of prejudices “researchers…re-assess their particular 
understanding of the nature of component 
phenomena” (p. 826).  
The re-assessment 
occurred through follow 
up interviews with the 
subjects, where the 
researchers’ initial 
interpretation of the events 
(in the previous stage) 
were presented to them, 
leading to further changes 
in interpretation. 
Fusion of horizons "The aim is to create, through shared 
meanings, new concepts that transcend 
originally held meanings” (p. 826). 
The researchers’ 
understandings are 
distilled in the form of 4 
insights, with 
corresponding abstractions 
(assertions). These insights 
were integrated into a 
meta-understanding for a 
more sophisticated insight. 
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